### **ANNEXES**

## Declaration of 9 May 1950

World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.

The contribution which an organised and living Europe can bring to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of champion of a united Europe, France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A united Europe was not achieved and we had war.

Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries.

With this aim in view, the French Government proposes that action be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point:

It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organisation open to the participation of the other countries of Europe.

The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims.

The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible. The setting up of this powerful productive unit, open to all countries willing to take part and bound ultimately to provide all the member countries with the basic elements of industrial production on the same terms, will lay a true foundation for their economic unification.

This production will be offered to the world as a whole without distinction or exception, with the aim of contributing to raising living standards and to promoting peaceful achievements. With increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent.

In this way, there will be realised simply and speedily that fusion of interest which is indispensable to the establishment of a common economic system; it may be the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by sanguinary divisions.

By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the realisation of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace. To promote the realisation of the objectives defined, the French Government is ready to open negotiations on the following bases:

The task with which this common High Authority will be charged will be that of securing in the shortest possible time the modernisation of production and the improvement of its quality; the supply of coal and steel on identical terms to the French and German markets, as well as to the markets of other member countries; the development in common of exports to other countries; the equalisation and improvement of the living conditions of workers in these industries.

To achieve these objectives, starting from the very different conditions in which the production of member countries is at present situated, it is proposed that certain transitional measures should be instituted, such as the application of a production and investment plan, the establishment of compensating machinery for equating prices, and the creation of a restructuring fund to facilitate the rationalisation of production. The movement of coal and steel between member countries will immediately be freed from all customs duty, and will not be affected by differential transport rates. Conditions will gradually be created which will spontaneously provide for the more national distribution of production at the highest level of productivity.

In contrast to international cartels, which tend to impose restrictive practices on distribution and the exploitation of national markets, and to maintain high profits, the organisation will ensure the fusion of markets and the expansion of production.

The essential principles and undertakings defined above will be the subject of a treaty signed between the States and submitted for the ratification of their parliaments. The negotiations required to settle details of applications will be undertaken with the help of an arbitrator appointed by common agreement. He will be entrusted with the task of seeing that the agreements reached conform with the principles laid down, and, in the event of a deadlock, he will decide what solution is to be adopted. The common High Authority entrusted with the management of the scheme will be composed of independent persons appointed by the governments, giving equal representation. A chairman will be chosen by common agreement between the governments. The authority's decisions will be enforceable in France, Germany and other member countries. Appropriate measures will be provided for means of appeal against the decisions of the authority.

A representative of the United Nations will be accredited to the authority, and will be instructed to make a public report to the United Nations twice yearly, giving an account of the working of the new organisation, particularly as concerns the safeguarding of its objectives.

The institution of the High Authority will in no way prejudge the methods of ownership of enterprises. In the exercise of its functions, the common High Authority will take into account the powers conferred upon the International Ruhr Authority and the obligations of all kinds imposed upon Germany, so long as these remain in force.

## I — THE SCHUMAN PLAN: A RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE POST-WAR PERIOD

### Historical background

The respite which should have followed the cessation of hostilities did not materialise for the people of Europe. No sooner had the Second World War ended than the threat of a third between East and West loomed up very guickly. The breakdown on 24 April 1947 of the Moscow conference on the German issue convinced the West that the Soviet Union, an ally in the fight against the Nazis, was about to become the source of an immediate threat to western democracies. The creation in October 1947 of the Kominform establishing a coalition of the world's communist parties, the 'Prague coup' of 25 February 1948 guaranteeing domination for the communists in Czechoslovakia, then the Berlin blockade in June 1948 which heralded the division of Germany into two countries, further heightened tension. By signing the Atlantic Pact with the United States on 4 April 1949, western Europe laid the basis of its collective security. However, the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb in September 1949 and the proliferation of threats from the Kremlin leaders contributed to spreading this climate of fear which came to be known as the cold war.

The status of the Federal Republic of Germany, which itself directed its own internal policy since the promulgation of the fundamental law of 23 May 1949, then became a focal point of East-West rivalry.

The United States wanted to step up the economic recovery of a country at the heart of the division of the continent and already in Washington there was a call in some quarters for the defeated power to be rearmed. French diplomacy was torn by a dilemma. Either it yielded to American pressure and, in the face of public opinion, agreed to the reconstitution of the German power on the Ruhr and the Saar; or else it stood firm against its main ally and took its relationship with Bonn into an impasse. In spring 1950 came the hour of truth. Robert Schuman, French Foreign Affairs Minister, had been entrusted by his American and British counterparts with a vital mission, namely to make a proposal to bring Federal Germany back into the western fold. A meeting between the three governments was scheduled for 10 May 1950 and France could not evade its responsibilities.

On top of the political deadlock came economic problems. Steelmaking capacity in the various European countries seemed set to create a crisis of overproduction. Demand was dwindling, prices were falling and the signs were that producers, faithful to the traditions of the forgemasters of the inter-war period, would reconstitute a cartel in order to restrict competition. In the midst of the reconstruction phase, the European economies could not stand by and leave their basic industries to speculation or organised shortages.





### **Jean Monnet's ideas**

In order to unravel this web of difficulties where traditional diplomacy was proving powerless, Robert Schuman called upon the inventive genious of a man as yet unknown to the general public but who had acquired exceptional experience during a very long and eventful international career. Jean Monnet, at the time responsible for the French modernisation plan and appointed by Charles de Gaulle in 1945 to put the country back on its economic feet, was one of the most influential Europeans in the western world. During the First World War, he had organ-

ised the joint supply structures for the Allied Forces. Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations, banker in the United States, western Europe and China, he was one of President Roosevelt's close advisers and the architect of the Victory programme which ensured America's military superiority over the Axis forces. Unfettered by any political mandate, he advised governments and had acquired the reputation of being a pragmatist whose prime concern was effectiveness.

The French Minister had approached Jean Monnet with his concerns. The question 'What to do about Germany?' was an

obsession for Robert Schuman, a native of Lorraine and a Christian moved by the resolve to do something so that any possibility of further war between the two countries could be averted once and for all.

At the head of a small team in rue de Martignac, headquarters of the *Commissariat au plan*, Jean Monnet was himself committed to this quest for a solution. His main concern was international politics. He felt that the cold war was the consequence of competition between the two big powers in Europe and a divided Europe was a source of major concern. Fostering unity in Europe would reduce tension. He pondered the merits of an international-level initiative mainly designed to decompress the situation and establish world peace through a real role played by a reborn, reconciled Europe.

Jean Monnet had watched the various unsuccessful attempts to move towards integration which had followed in the wake of the solemn plea, launched at the congress organised by the European movement in The Hague in 1948, for the union of the continent.

The European Organisation for Economic Cooperation, set up in 1948, had a purely coordinative mission and had been powerless to prevent the economic recovery of European countries coming about in a strictly national framework. The creation of the Council of Europe on 5 May 1949 showed that governments were not prepared to surrender their prerogatives. The advisory body had only deliberative powers and each of its resolutions, which had to be approved by a two-thirds majority, could be vetoed by the ministerial committee.

Jean Monnet had understood that any attempt to introduce a comprehensive institutional structure in one go would bring a huge outcry from the different countries and was doomed to failure. It was too early yet to envisage wholesale transfers of sovereignty. The war was too recent an experience in people's minds and national feelings were still running very high.

Success depended on limiting objectives to specific areas, with a major psychological impact, and introducing a joint decision-making mechanism which would gradually be given additional responsibilities.

### The declaration of 9 May 1950

Jean Monnet and his co-workers during the close of April 1950 drafted a note of a few pages setting out both the rationale behind, and the steps envisaged in, a proposal which was going to radically shake up traditional diplomacy. As he set about his task, instead of the customary consultations of the responsible ministerial departments, Jean Monnet on the contrary maintained the utmost discretion in order to avoid the inevitable objections or counterproposals which would have detracted from the revolutionary nature of the project and removed the advantage of surprise. When he handed over his document to Bernard Clappier, director of Robert Schuman's private office, lean Monnet knew that the minister's decision could alter the course of events. So when, upon his return from a weekend in his native Lorraine, Robert Schuman told his colleagues: 'I've read this proposal. I'll use it', the initiative had entered the political arena. At the same time as the French Minister was defending his proposal on the morning of 9 May, in front of his government colleagues, a messenger from his



private office delivered it personally to Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn. The latter's reaction was immediate and enthusiastic. He immediately replied that he was wholeheartedly behind the proposal.

So, backed by the agreement of both the French and the German Governments, Robert Schuman made his declaration public at a press conference held at 4 p.m. in the salon de l'Horloge at the Quai d'Orsay. He preceded his declaration with a few introductory sentences: 'It is no longer a time for vain words, but for a bold, constructive act. France has acted, and the consequences of her action may be immense. We hope they will. She has acted essentially in the cause of peace. For peace to have a chance, there must first be a

Europe. Nearly five years to the day after the unconditional surrender of Germany, France is now taking the first decisive step towards the construction of Europe and is associating Germany in this venture. It is something which must completely change things in Europe and permit other joint actions which were hitherto impossible. Out of all this will come forth Europe, a solid and united Europe. A Europe in which the standard of living will rise thanks to the grouping of production and the expansion of markets, which will bring down prices ...'

The scene was thus set. This was no new technical arrangement subject to fierce bargaining. France extended a hand to Germany, proposing that it take part on an

Le 6 Mai 1950

La paix mondiale ne saurait être sauvegardée sans des efforts oréateurs à la mesure des dangers qui la menacent.

La contribution qu'une Europe organisée et vivante peut appor ter à la civilisation est indispensable au maintien des relations pacifiques. En se faisant depuis plus de 20 ans le champion d'une Europe unie, la France a toujours eu pour objet essentiel de servir la paix. L'Europe n'a pas été faite, nous avons eu la guerre.

L'Europe ne se fera pas d'un coup, ni dans une construction d'ensemble : elle se fera par des réalisations concrètes créant d'abord une solidarité de fait. Le ressemblement des nations européennes exige que l'opposition séculàire de la France et de l'Allemagne soit éliminée : l'action entreprise doit toucher au premier chef la France et l'Allemagne.

Dans ce but, le Gouvernement Français propose de porter issédintement l'action sur un point limité mais décisif :

Le Gouvernement Français propose de placer l'ensemble de la production franco-allemande de charbon et d'acter, sous une Haute Autorité commune, dans une organisation ouverte à la participation des autres pays d'Europe.

La mise en comman des productions de charbon et d'acter assaérers immédiatement l'établissement de bases communes de développement économique, première étaps de la Fédération suropéenne, et changera le destin de ces régions longtemps vouées à la fabrication des armes de guerre dont elles ont été les plus constantes victimes.

Facsimile of a final draft of the Robert Schuman declaration of 9 May 1950. This final draft was the ninth. Robert Schuman's team put the final touches to it on 6 May 1950.

equal footing in a new entity, first to manage jointly coal and steel in the two countries, but also on a broader level to lay the first stone of the European federation.

The declaration (see annex) puts forward a number of principles:

- Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through practical achievements which will first create real solidarity;
- the age-old enmity between France and Germany must be eliminated; any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries, but it is open to any other European nations which share the aims:
- action must be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point: Franco-German production of coal and steel must be placed under a common High Authority;
- the fusion of these economic interests will help to raise the standard of living and establish a European Community;
- the decisions of the High Authority will be binding on the member countries. The High Authority itself will be composed of independent persons and have equal representation. The authority's decisions will be enforceable.

### The preparation of the ECSC Treaty

Swift action was needed for the French initiative, which quickly became a Franco-German initiative, to retain its chances of becoming reality. On 20 June 1950, France convened an intergovernmental conference

in Paris, chaired by Jean Monnet. The three Benelux countries and Italy answered the call and were at the negotiating table. Jean Monnet circumscribed the spirit of the discussions which were about to open: 'We are here to undertake a common task — not to negotiate for our own national advantage, but to seek it to the advantage of all. Only if we eliminate from our debates any particularist feelings shall we reach a solution. In so far as we, gathered here, can change our methods, the attitude of all Europeans will likewise gradually change' (1).

The discussions were an opportunity to clarify the type of international edifice envisaged. The independence and the powers of the High Authority were never questioned, for they constituted the central point of the proposal. At the request of the Netherlands, the Council of Ministers, representing the Member States and which was to give its assent in certain cases, was set up. A Parliamentary Assembly and a Court of Justice were to round off the structure which underpins the institutional system of the current Communities.

The negotiators never lost sight of the fact that they had the political mandate to construct an organisation which was totally new with regard to its objectives and methods. It was essential for the emerging institution to avoid all the shortcomings peculiar to the traditional intergovernmental organisations: the requirement of unanimity for national financial contributions, and subordination of the executive to the representatives of the national States.

<sup>(1)</sup> Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, (trad. R. Mayne): London, etc., William Collins and Son Ltd, 1976, p. 323.



Robert Schuman's declaration of 9 May 1950 was followed, on 18 April 1951, by the signing of the Treaty of Paris, the first of the Treaties establishing the European Community.

On 18 April 1951, the Treaty establishing the Coal and Steel Community was signed for a period of 50 years. It was ratified by the six signatory countries and on

10 August 1952 the High Authority, chaired by Jean Monnet, took up its seat in Luxembourg.

# II — THE SCHUMAN PLAN: THE BIRTH OF COMMUNITY EUROPE

'The Schuman proposals are revolutionary or they are nothing. The indispensable first principle of these proposals is the abnegation of sovereignty in a limited but decisive field. A plan which is not based on this principle can make no useful contribution to the solution of the major problems which undermine our existence. Cooperation between nations, while essential, cannot alone meet our problem. What must be sought is a fusion of the interests of the European peoples and not merely another effort to maintain the equilibrium of those interests ...'

**Jean Monnet** 

# The innovatory principles of the first European Community

The reason it took nearly a year to conclude the negotiations of the Treaty of Paris was that these negotiations gave rise to a series of fundamental questions to which Jean Monnet wished to provide the most appropriate answers. As we have seen, this was no traditional diplomatic negotiation. The persons designated by the six governments had come together to invent a totally new — and lasting — legal and political system.

The preamble to the ECSC Treaty, comprising five short paragraphs, contains the whole philosophy which was to be the leitmotif of the promoters of European construction:

'Considering that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts commensurate with the dangers that threaten it:

convinced that the contribution which an organised and vital Europe can make to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations:

recognising that Europe can be built only through practical achievements which will first of all create real solidarity, and through the establishment of common bases for economic development:

anxious to help, by expanding their basic production, to raise the standard of living and further the works of peace;

resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared'.



The first European iron ingot was cast on 30 April 1953 in Esch-sur-Alzette, Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg. Jean Monnet, President, and the members of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community celebrate the event.

(Source: Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Lausanne).

'World peace', 'practical achievements', 'real solidarity', 'merging of essential interests', 'community', 'destiny henceforward shared': these are all key words which are the embryonic form of both the spirit and the Community method and still today retain their rallying potential.

While the prime objective of the ECSC Treaty, i.e. the management of the coal and steel market, today no longer has the same importance as before, for the European economy of the 1950s, the institutional principles which it laid down are still very much topical. They started a momentum of which we are still reaping the benefits and which fuels a political vision which we must be careful not to depart from if we are not to call into question our precious 'acquis communautaire'.

Four Community principles stem from the Schuman plan and they form the basis of the current Community edifice.

### The overarching role of the institutions

The application to international relations of the principles of equality, arbitration and conciliation which are in force within democracies is progress for civilisation. The founding fathers had experienced the chaos, violence and the arbitrary which are the companions of war. Their entire endeavour was geared at creating a community in which right prevailed over might. Jean Monnet often quoted the Swiss philosopher Amiel: 'Every man's experience is a new start. Only institutions become wiser: they amass the collective experience and thanks to this experience and this

wisdom, the nature of men subordinated to the same rules will not change, but their behaviour gradually will.'

To place relations between countries on a pacific and democratic footing, casting out the spirit of domination and nationalism, these were the deep-seated motivations which gave the first Community its political content and placed it amongst the major historic achievements.

The independence of the Community bodies

If institutions are to fulfil their functions they must have their own authority. Today's Community institutions still benefit from the three guarantees which were given to the ECSC High Authority:

- the appointment of members, today commissioners, by joint agreement between the governments (2). These are not national delegates, but personalities exercising their power collegially and who may not receive instructions from the Member States. The European civil service is subordinated to this same and unique Community allegiance;
- financial independence through the levying of own resources and not, as is the case of international organisations, by the payment of national contributions which means they can be called into question;
- the responsibility of the High Authority, and today that of the Commission, exclusively to the Assembly (today the

European Parliament), which can cast, by a qualified majority vote, a vote of censure.

### Cooperation between the institutions

For Jean Monnet, the independence of the High Authority was the cornerstone of the new system. However, as the negotiations continued, he acknowledged the need to give the Member States the opportunity to assert their national interests. This was the safest way of preventing the emerging community from being limited to excessively technical objectives, for it needed to be also able to intervene in sectors in which macroeconomic decisions would be taken and these were a matter for the governments. Hence the creation, alongside the High Authority, of our Council of Ministers the role of which was strictly limited in that it was not called upon to decide unanimously but by majority. Its assent was required only in limited cases. The High Authority retained the monopoly of legislative initiative, a prerogative which, extended to the competences of the present Commission, is essential in that it is the guarantee that all Community interests will be defended in a proposal from the college. From 1951 on, dialogue was organised between the four institutions on a basis not of subordination but of cooperation, each institution exercising its own functions within a comprehensive decision-making system of a pre-federal type.

### Equality between Member States

As the principle of representation of States within the Council had been selected, there remained the delicate matter of their respective weighting. The Benelux countries and Italy, fearing that they would be placed in a minority situation on account of

<sup>(2)</sup> The European Commission is also subordinated to the vote of investiture by the European Parliament.

the proportion of their production of coal and steel in relation to total production, argued in favour of the rule of unanimity. Germany, on the other hand, advocated a system of representation proportional to production, a proposal which of course could hardly allay partners' misgivings, quite the opposite.

Jean Monnet was convinced that only the principle of equality between countries could produce a new mentality. However, he was aware of how difficult it was to get six countries of unequal dimensions to forego the option of a veto. For the big countries in their relations with one another and for the smaller countries in their relations with the bigger countries '... Their innermost security lay in their power to say No, which is the privilege of national sovereignty' (3). The chairman of the conference accordingly met Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn on 4 April 1951 to convince him of the virtues of the principle of equality:

'I have been authorised to propose to you that relations between France and Germany in the European Community be based on the principle of equality in the Council, the Assembly and all future or existing institutions ... Let me add that this is how I have always envisaged the offer of union which was the starting point of the present Treaty; and I think I am right in saying this is how you envisaged it from the moment we first met. The spirit of discrimination has been the cause of the world's greatest ills, and the Community is an attempt to overcome it'.

The Chancellor replied immediately:

'You know how much I am attached to equality of rights for my country in the future, and how much I deplore the attempts at domination in which it has been involved in the past. I am happy to pledge my full support for your proposal. I cannot conceive of a Community based on anything but complete equality'.

Thus was laid one of the legal and moral foundations which gives the notion of Community its full meaning.

# The ECSC, the first stone in the European edifice

In the absence of a peace treaty between the former warring sides, the first European Community was both an act of confidence in the resolve of France and Germany and their partners to sublimate the mistakes of the past and perform an act of faith in a common future of progress. Despite the ups and downs of history and of nationalist opposition, the process began in 1950 was never to stop. The failure of the project for a European Defence Community on 30 August 1954, after the rejection by the French National Assembly of the Treaty signed on 27 May 1952, did not halt the initial momentum. At the initiative of statesmen from the Benelux countries, Paul Henri Spaak, Jan Beyen and Joseph Bech, the process was relaunched at Messina in June 1955. The onward march towards the Treaty of Rome, signed on 25 March 1957, establishing the European Economic Community and Euratom, was boosted by external events: the Suez crisis and the repression in Hungary prompted Europe to close ranks. The European Communities set up in Brussels and Luxembourg grew in

<sup>(3)</sup> Jean Monnet, op. cit., pp. 330 et seq.

terms of content and number of participants.

The common market was consolidated by common policies in agriculture, trade, regional affairs, social affairs, research, the environment, education, and cooperation with the third world. In 1972, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark joined the Communities; later the entry of Greece, Spain and Portugal brought a bigger Mediterranean presence into the Community. In 1995, the 15-country Europe emerges with the membership of Austria, Finland and Sweden.

Weakened by the two successive oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, the Community nevertheless resisted centrifugal tendencies and consolidated its cohesion by introducing a European Monetary System in 1979. This system gradually paved the way for a slow but irreversible move towards economic and monetary union which came to fruition on 1 January 1999 with the adoption of the euro by 11 Member States of the European Union.

Like any undertaking constantly evolving, Europe could not evade teething troubles and growing pains: the institutional crisis of 1965 when one Member State attempted to call into question the majority system of voting; and the financial crisis caused by the mismatch between own resources and the sharp increases in expenditure arising from the proliferation of new policies and the increasing costs of the common agricultural policy.

Nevertheless, no matter how categorical its demands may have been, no Member State has contemplated leaving a Community which is seen as an irreplaceable framework for the development and international status of its member countries.

In 1984, the European Parliament adopted a draft treaty on European union, proposing that the institutions make a quantum leap in terms of integration. By adopting the White Paper on the large internal market in 1985, the Commission, headed by Jacques Delors, gave concrete expression to this resolve for recovery and set a target date of 1 January 1993.

By signing the Single Act in 1986, the Member States drew their inspiration and institutional method from the Schuman plan. They supplemented the Treaty of Rome with a series of specific objectives around the central objective of a large frontier-free market and established a timetable. They renewed the decision-making process by extending the scope for decision-making by a qualified majority vote. They restored hope to millions of European citizens by offering them a broader horizon and giving them the wherewithal to come to terms with a changing world.

While the European institutions were putting the finishing touches to the internal market and increasing the economic and social dimension of Community Europe, history made its presence felt again as an unforeseeable, mighty force, testing the capacities of Europeans to adapt and adjust to a changing world.

The fall of the Berlin Wall on 3 October 1990, followed by the reunification of Germany and the democratisation of the countries of central and eastern Europe, freed from the yoke of the Soviet Union, itself prey to its own disintegration in December 1991, brought about a radical

change in the political structure of our continent.

Once again, countries were faced with a dilemma, whether to take the soft option of focusing national policies on immediate interests or embrace a common vision and management of their joint future. Opting to give priority to respect their European commitment and acknowledging the need to incorporate such upheaval into a common perspective, the Member States committed themselves to a process of consolidation of the Union by negotiating a new treaty, of which the new guidelines were adopted at the Maastricht European Council meeting of 9 and 10 December 1991.

The Treaty on European Union, which entered into force on 1 November 1993 set an ambitious timetable for the Member States: monetary union by 1999, new common policies, European citizenship, common foreign and security policy, and

internal security. A revision clause in the Maastricht Treaty prompted the Member States to negotiate a new treaty, signed in Amsterdam on 2 October 1997, adjusting and strengthening the Union's policies and resources, particularly in the areas of legal cooperation, freedom of movement of persons, foreign policy and public health. The European Parliament, direct democratic expression of the Union, received new responsibilities confirming its role as co-legislator.

Fifty years of existence have not taken the edge off the driving inspiration from which the European Community emerged.

Will the heirs of the founding fathers, today responsible for the destiny of the peoples of the whole continent, from Lisbon to Tallinn, from Dublin to Warsaw, take on board the final message of Jean Monnet (4), the guiding light of this first Community, who urges them to adopt his vision of the future?

arrived at. The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present; they cannot ensure their own progress or control their own future. And the Community itself is only a stage on the way to the organised world of the future.'

<sup>(4) &#</sup>x27;We cannot stop, when the whole world around us is on the move. Have I said clearly enough that the Community we have created is not an end in itself? It is a process of change, continuing that process which in an earlier period of history produced our national forms of life. Like our provinces in the past, our nations today must learn today to live together under common rules and institutions freely

Jean Monnet, Memoirs (trad. R. Mayne): London, etc., William Collins and Son Ltd, 1976, p. 524.