Strengthening Europe’s preparedness is urgent as it faces heightened risks and uncertainty, marked by a severe pandemic, major war, and record heat. Sauli Niinistö, former Finnish President and Special Adviser to the European Commission President, was tasked by President von der Leyen and the HR/VP to assess these challenges and propose ways to boost the EU’s civilian and military readiness. The report highlights the need for a new, ambitious approach, offering around 80 recommendations for immediate and long-term actions.
1. “To ensure the EU’s capacity to take autonomous and decisive action in the face of elevated threat levels, there is an urgent need to take better advantage of intelligence analysis at the EU level. Decision-makers in the EU institutions and Member States need to have a clear and timely understanding of threats and clandestine activities targeting the Union. This is why reinforcing the EU’s Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), consisting of the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) and EU military intelligence as part of the EU Military Staff in the EEAS (both working under the High Representative) is a core priority, as recognised in the Strategic Compass. SIAC already provides strategic analysis based on intelligence shared by Member States, supported by open-source intelligence (OSINT)” .
2. “The intelligence sharing from Member States on which SIAC relies needs to be further strengthened and structured, including to target concrete operational needs at the EU level. The aim is also to make sure that EU leaders have available the best possible intelligence to guide informed decision-making both on long-term strategic needs, as well as in a crisis demanding urgent action, and that the policies of relevant services are based on robust intelligence threat assessments” .
3. “Strengthening intelligence cooperation at the EU level should be done by establishing stronger frameworks for regular and structured intelligence sharing across policy domains – in full complementarity with and respecting Member States’ prerogatives in terms of intelligence gathering” .
4. “The EU should have a fully-fledged intelligence cooperation service, serving all EU institutions and Member States. The goal should not be to emulate the tasks of Member States’ national foreign intelligence and domestic security services, nor to interfere with their prerogative on national security. Instead, focus should be on further developing SIAC into a service that can fully support the EU’s activities and institutional leadership in line with the Union’s broad and unique role as a security provider in respect of and in complementarity with the Member States’ national capabilities in intelligence gathering” .
5. “The EU’s clout in foreign, security and defence policy together with the growing tensions in international relations make EU decision-makers and those who do the preparatory work for them increasingly important targets for hostile intelligence services” .
6. “Counter-espionage must be made a key element of security work in the EU institutions” .
7. “Ensure the creation of a robust framework for lawful access to encrypted data to support the fight of Member States’ authorities against espionage, sabotage and terrorism, as well as organised crime” .
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