Federico Fubini’s article analyses Italy’s delicate position in the current geopolitical context, highlighting how the country is struggling to choose between an alliance with Europe and maintaining a privileged relationship with the United States. The author uses the experience of the Covid-19 pandemic as a metaphor for understanding the challenges of common European defence: just as the joint purchase of vaccines represented a coordinated response to a public health emergency, today the European Union is facing a collective security crisis that would require the same level of cooperation. Italy, however, seems reluctant to commit itself in this direction, showing a sceptical and distant attitude towards initiatives to strengthen common defence, such as the ReArm Europe project promoted by the European Commission.
The parallel with the pandemic is useful for understanding the decision-making mechanisms of the European institutions and the reactions of the population. During the public health emergency, the EU purchased almost two billion doses of vaccine, at a huge cost and with a distribution that was not always optimal. As a result, millions of doses were destroyed because they had expired, but the overall value of the vaccination campaign was undeniable: it saved millions of lives, facilitated economic recovery and ensured stability. However, the management of the emergency has generated criticism and mistrust, elements that are now re-emerging in the debate on European defence. The risk, according to Fubini, is that the urgency to create a common security system will lead to hasty decisions that will further fuel the mistrust of a part of public opinion that is susceptible to conspiracy theories and disinformation.
Italy stands out from the rest of Europe in a growing tendency towards ‘neutrality’ in the war in Ukraine. An Ipsos poll shows that 57% of Italians do not side with either Russia or Ukraine, while three years ago the majority supported Kiev. Another study by the European Council on Foreign Relations shows that 50% of Italians do not consider Ukraine to be part of Europe, while the country is among the least likely to blame Moscow for the conflict. This position is also reflected in political decisions: Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has taken a cautious line on military funding for Ukraine and Italian participation in a European defence force, while the secretary of the Democratic Party, Elly Schlein, opposes the EU’s rearmament plan. Many Italians fear that the military build-up will come at the expense of welfare, with possible repercussions for pensions and health care.
Italy seems to want to adopt a role similar to that of Switzerland: a kind of strategic neutrality that allows it to avoid clear alignments and to maintain open relations with all global players. This position, however, makes it an exception in the Western panorama, where Germany, France, the UK and Poland have embarked on a decisive path of rearmament and support for Ukraine. As a result, Italy risks losing its political weight on the international stage and becoming marginalised in the face of the major European powers and the Scandinavian countries themselves, which together are exerting a growing influence.
According to Fubini, there are seven fundamental truths that Italians should know in order to understand the scale of the European security challenge. First, for decades Italy has benefited from American military protection without seriously investing in its own defence: military spending is among the lowest in the Western world. Second, there is a gulf between the defence community, which sees Russia as an immediate threat, and the political community, which remains sceptical of this analysis. If Ukraine were to fall, the Kremlin could gain control of the second largest and most heavily armed army in Europe after Russia’s. Moreover, Italy’s security depends on strategic infrastructure such as NATO bases in Romania, which could become vulnerable to local political changes.
According to the author, Russian aggression manifests itself not only through military invasion, but also through hybrid attacks: sabotage, cyber-attacks and clandestine operations that undermine the stability of European countries. The Russian military presence in Libya is another risk factor for Italy, given the strategic proximity of the two countries. Finally, the issue of nuclear deterrence becomes critical: if Italy wanted to count on the protection of France and the United Kingdom, it would have to contribute economically to the maintenance of their arsenals, since neither country would agree to expose its cities to a possible attack without sharing the costs and responsibilities.
The lesson of the pandemic, therefore, is not only about the management of health crises, but also about the way in which decisions are communicated and perceived by the population. Italians tend to distrust official versions when they seem incomplete or watered down, which fuels scepticism and resistance. If European security becomes a central issue, Italy will no longer be able to afford to remain in a position of annuity, relying on alliances that are no longer guaranteed. The Pax Americana, which for decades guaranteed stability on the continent, is failing and Europe must equip itself with autonomous instruments for its own defence. But Italy still seems reluctant to take this step, caught between nostalgia for the Cold War and the desire for a neutrality that could prove unsustainable in today’s world.
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