In The Age of Forever Wars: Why Military Strategy No Longer Delivers Victory (Published on Foreign Affairs, April 14, 2025), Lawrence D. Freedman offers a sobering critique of contemporary military strategy, revealing its dangerous reliance on outdated assumptions about the nature and duration of modern warfare. Central to his argument is the persistent “short war fallacy”—the belief that with the right combination of speed, technological superiority, and surprise, decisive victories can be achieved swiftly. This idea, though historically seductive, has repeatedly failed to withstand the complex realities of twenty-first-century conflict. From Afghanistan to Ukraine, and from Gaza to the Sahel, military campaigns that were intended to be quick and overwhelming have devolved into prolonged, attritional wars with no clear endpoint. Despite this consistent pattern, strategists continue to plan as if wars can be won in days, overlooking the likelihood of entanglement and escalation (“Underestimating the enemy’s political as well as military resources is one of the main reasons that short-war strategies fail”, p. 15).
Freedman argues that effective warfighting strategy today requires not just operational finesse, but political clarity. A realistic theory of victory must align military means with attainable political ends. This involves accepting the possibility—indeed, the likelihood—that wars will not resolve quickly and may not culminate in traditional victories. Instead, success may depend on securing limited but durable outcomes that reflect both the capabilities of the intervening power and the resilience of the adversary. The U.S. Gulf War strategy in 1991 is presented as a rare success in this regard: limited in scope and ambition, it achieved its stated goal—liberating Kuwait—without attempting regime change or broader regional transformation. Contrast this with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which failed in part because it was predicated on a series of gross political miscalculations, including the assumption that Kyiv would collapse under the weight of initial military pressure.
The most thought-provoking insight Freedman offers lies in his reinterpretation of deterrence. Rather than preparing solely for rapid military victory, he suggests that states must also be visibly prepared for the possibility of prolonged conflict. This preparation, paradoxically, becomes a form of deterrence in itself. By demonstrating an ability to endure and adapt over time—politically, militarily, and economically—states can signal to potential adversaries that any attempt at a quick conquest is doomed to become a costly quagmire. In this sense, readiness for protracted war is not a sign of pessimism but a necessary component of strategic credibility. As Freedman puts it, “By preparing for protraction and reducing any potential aggressor’s confidence in being able to wage a successful short war, defense strategists could provide another kind of deterrent” (p. 22). This reframing challenges long-held assumptions about how wars are fought and how peace is secured in the modern age.
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